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Abstract 
 This paper analyzes the impacts of the Malawi Social Cash Transfer Scheme. The goal of 
this paper is to help improve the design of cash transfers. First of all, I analyze whether the cash 
transfer positively affects child health variables despite occurring in a region with poor supply 
side health institutions. I find significant results for many child level variables, such as frequency 
of illnesses, but insignificant improvements in anthropometric measurements. Secondly, I 
examine whether female-headed households invest more in child health than male-headed 
households. The results show that the impacts of the cash transfer did not depend on the sex of 
the household head. This result provides some evidence that females do not always have 
systematically different preferences for expenditure on children than males. The paper uses the 
imperfect randomization of the cash transfer in combination with difference-in-differences 
regressions, propensity score matching, and Lee Bounds tests in order to ensure the robustness of 
the results. 
Table of Contents 
1. Introduction ................................................................................................................... 1 
2. Theory ............................................................................................................................ 6 
2.1 Program Theory Framework .................................................................................... 6 
2.2 Household Decision Making ..................................................................................... 7 
3. Data .............................................................................................................................. 11 
3.1 Program Description............................................................................................... 11 
3.2 Differences Between Control and Treatment Groups for Independent Variables .. 13 
3.3 Dependent Variables ............................................................................................... 16 
4. Empirical Approach and Results for Child Health Outcomes ............................... 20 
4.1 Difference-in-difference .......................................................................................... 21 
4.2 Propensity Score Matching ..................................................................................... 23 
4.3 General impact of treatment on child health outcomes .......................................... 25 
4.4 Linear combination and DD framework for gender specific results ...................... 28 
4.5 Results for impact differences between male and female headed households ........ 29 
4.6 Lee Bounds .............................................................................................................. 30 
4.7 Results of Lee Bounds Testing ................................................................................. 31 
5. Conclusion ................................................................................................................... 33 
Works Cited ..................................................................................................................... 35 
Tables ............................................................................................................................... 39 
 
 
 
 
 
1 
 
1. Introduction  
 
 The intergenerational transfer of poverty is an especially distressing occurrence. 
The consequences of poor nutrition and health remain with children for the entirety of 
their lives.  Dr. Martorell (1997) outlined the long term effects of malnutrition for 
children; reduced IQ, physical growth, increased behavioral problems, decreased 
attention, and lower educational achievement. These effects persist throughout life and 
occur even among children without the clinical signs of malnutrition. Poor health even 
reduces the ‘basic capabilities’ that Amartya Sen (1999) shows are crucial to having an 
acceptable quality of life and escape poverty. 
Many aid programs, such as the UN’s World Food Program, try to address the 
immediate causes of poor health by increasing food and nutrition intake. These programs 
might be failing to address some of the underlying causes. Poor health and nutrition are 
caused by poverty, inequality, food insecurity, and an inability to access supply side 
institutions. According to Leroy et al. (2009), cash transfer programs could address both 
the underlying and direct causes of childhood malnutrition. Cash transfers were first 
popularized in South America and have since expanded throughout the world. The 
transfers provide regular cash payments, often conditional on certain behaviors. The 
purpose of these programs is to encourage investment in human capital while at the same 
time providing aid to the poor. Proponents of these programs view cash transfers as 
preferable to in-kind transfers because they can cause fewer market distortions and 
provide the poor with more expenditure flexibility. The majority of the programs are 
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contingent on health and education-seeking behavior, especially in the cases of children 
and pregnant women. 
 Mexico’s Progresa program (later renamed Oportunidades) was the first 
comprehensive national conditional cash transfer program. Oportunidades provides cash 
transfers to households with additional benefits for children enrolled in school. It also 
offers nutritional supplements and incentives for preventative care and now serves over 
six and a half million families. This program has been extensively studied due to the fact 
that the program began with a staggered rollout that provided economists with an 
experimental counterfactual. Gertler (2000) finds a reported reduction of sickness in the 
previous four weeks of 4.2 percentage points for children under the age of three. Gertler 
(2004) finds that children whose families had received Oportunidades were taller and 
were 25.5% less likely to be anemic. Van de Gaer et al. (2013) notes positive impacts of 
the Oportunidades program on anthropometric measures with the results being most 
pronounced for poor indigenous children. 
 Many other countries have started similar programs. For example, Brazil 
implemented its Bolsa Familia program, which focuses on incentivizing education. Other 
South American countries have followed suit as well, such as Chile, Columbia, 
Honduras, and Peru. The success of these programs has inspired countries outside of the 
Americas to begin implementing their own cash transfer programs. A key component of 
many of these programs has been targeting transfers towards females because it is 
believed that women are more likely to spend the transfers on improving the well-being 
of their children (Quisumbing et al., 1995). 
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 Lagarde et al. (2009) conducted a comprehensive review of the literature on many 
of these cash transfer programs and their impact on the health status of household 
members. The surveys that they included in their reviews were of a high standard. Most 
were performed under either experimental or quasi-experimental conditions and the 
resulting papers contained minimal methodological flaws. They find that the cash 
transfers increased the use of health services and improved nutritional status as well as 
anthropomorphic health indicators. However, they do not find evidence of effects on 
health care expenditure. They conclude that it is unclear as to whether these programs 
would produce similar results without conditional elements or whether most of the 
beneficial effects are simply a result of the additional spending power from the cash 
transfer. According to Davis et al. (2012), there still remain significant unanswered 
questions as to what the effect of the conditional elements of cash transfers are. Lagarde 
et al. (2009) end their review by stating that the replicability of their results needs to be 
tested under different conditions; specifically in deprived settings such as in areas of sub-
Saharan Africa. They note that the lack of effective primary care facilities might alter any 
health outcomes of conditional cash transfers. Cash transfers help households by 
providing cash to generate demand, but supply side issues might prevent improvements 
in health if there are not adequate health facilities. 
 Recently, several African countries have created their own cash transfer programs 
and begun research to evaluate whether or not the programs are effective. These 
programs are fundamentally demand side solutions. They encourage the use preventative 
medicine and the accumulation of education, but if effective supply side institutions do 
not exist then they might prove to be ineffective. Many countries lack the proper 
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infrastructure, especially in rural communities where the need is most dire. Monitoring 
the conditionality of the programs creates further constraints because it imposes 
additional costs and requires a professionalized bureaucracy.   
The goal of this paper is to bridge this gap in the literature by examining the effect 
of cash transfers in Malawi, a country that lags the Americas in terms of infrastructure.  
The Malawi Social Cash Transfer Scheme (SCTS) provides an ideal opportunity to 
access the efficacy of cash transfers without strong conditional elements. Approximately 
22% of the population lives in ultra-poverty, spend almost all of their income on food, 
and fail to consume an acceptable minimum caloric intake. These people constitute the 
poorest of the poor in an underdeveloped country. The SCTS is targeted at the neediest 
10% of the population with the goal of reducing ultra-poverty rates in the country to 10% 
by 2015. The program is effectively unconditional, though its recipients are encouraged 
to use the cash transfer for educational purposes. They also receive additional funds 
based on whether or not the household contains school-aged children. These cash 
transfers are also not specifically targeted towards females. 
I use the quasi-experimental conditions of the SCTS program to test if cash 
transfers significantly improve the health of children even in the absence of strong 
conditional elements. Propensity score matching and differences-in-differences 
techniques allow me to correct for any flaws in the experimental design. Moreover, I 
examine whether female household heads have systematically different expenditure 
preferences than male household heads.  I generally find positive impacts on child health. 
For example, the percentage of children who were sick in the last month decreased by 9.4 
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percentage points and I find a decrease in the number of respondents who said they were 
unable to seek care by 6.4 percentage points. Unfortunately, I do not find improvements 
in anthropometric measurements (such as height for age, weight for age, and bmi for 
age). There also seems to be no systematic difference in expenditure preferences for 
female and male headed households. This finding does not prove females in general do 
not have systematically different preferences. Instead, it provides evidence that it is 
important to consider the cultural context rather than assuming that it is always better to 
provide the cash transfers solely to females. 
The paper is structured as follows.  Sections 2 and 3 present the theory and data, 
respectively.  The methodology and results are discussed in Sections 4 and 5, 
respectively. Finally, conclusions are presented in Section 6. 
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2. Theory 
  
2.1 Program Theory Framework 
 
 There are multiple channels through which cash transfers might improve the 
health and nutrition of children. Leroy et al. (2009) outline the major pathways through 
which cash transfers can improve the health of children. They begin by outlining the most 
basic mechanisms through which the cash transfer programs can work; increased 
purchasing power for the household, the provision of fortified products, education of 
household decision makers about health and nutrition, and conditional elements, such as 
having to attend school or visit health clinics. Leroy et al. also include various 
intermediary pathways. For example, the increased purchasing power might free 
additional time to care for household members or it might allow the household to 
purchase food with higher nutritional content. 
 These are all elements common to many cash transfer programs and therefore it 
has been difficult determining what mechanism is the most effective. The cash transfer in 
Malawi is particularly helpful in this debate because it does not include conditional 
elements and it does not provide any nutritional supplements. Therefore the Malawi cash 
transfer should only affect the nutrition and health of children through the increased 
spending power that it gives households. It is important to discover if the cash transfers 
are primarily effective through this pathway because monitoring requirements add 
additional costs to the program as well as decreasing the uptake rate. If there are 
significant impacts on the nutrition and health of children in the Malawi SCTS then it 
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shows that providing poor households with increased purchasing power might be an 
effective way to improve child health outcomes in countries with poor supply side 
infrastructure. 
 
2.2 Household Decision Making 
 
 There is also the theoretical question about whether a household should be treated 
as a single unitary decision making entity. If this assertion is true then the recipient’s 
gender should not be a factor, but there have been both theoretical reasons and empirical 
reasons to reject his model of household decision making.  Manser and Brown (1980) 
developed a model of intra-household bargaining. They recognized that different 
individuals in the household have different preferences and that household decisions are 
bargained results. The distribution of power in a household (whether power from income 
or from social norms) effects what decision is reached. If males and females in a 
household have systematically different preferences then the gender of the recipient of 
the cash transfer might be pertinent. Giving the cash transfer to the female in a household 
theoretically increases her bargaining power. If the females systematically prefer 
expenditures on the well-being of children in comparison to men, then the most effective 
solution to increase the human capital accumulation for children is to give the transfers to 
females. 
 Chiappori (1988) created a theoretical model for shocks to non-labor income, 
such as a cash transfer. The household is composed of H members. Every household 
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member receives non-labor income in the current period of yt
h
. They can purchase at pt a 
vector of goods (q1,…., qN). His model assumes that there is no borrowing or saving from 
one period to the next for the sake of simplicity. The utility of each member of the 
household depends on the consumption bundles purchased by every other member in the 
current period and on an individual specific shock Єt
h
 with mean Єh. 
           
 
   
        
   
              The household will maximize         
     such that    
   
 
   =   
  
   =   
for t=1,…,T. Duflo (2000) uses this model as a basis to examine whether the gender of 
recipients of a South African pension scheme affects the impact on grandchildren. Duflo 
shows how a permanent exogenous shock in non-labor income affects the household 
member’s weight in the optimization problem by increasing the member’s outside 
options.  If women have systematically different preferences than men, an exogenous 
shock to the non-labor income of a female should have different effects on child health 
than an exogenous shock to the non-labor income of a male.  
 There has been research suggesting that females do have systematically different 
preferences. Thomas (1990) finds that income from assets owned by women significantly 
and positively affects child nutrition and health as well as leading to larger expenditure 
shares for health, nutrition, and housing (Thomas 1994).  Lundberg et al. (1997) use a 
natural experiment created by a change in the mode of allocating child benefits in the 
United Kingdom from a tax credit to a direct payment to the mother. They find that the 
change was associated with an increased share of expenditure on women’s and children’s 
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clothing relative to men’s clothing. Duflo (2000) also finds that the gender of the cash 
transfer recipient in the South Africa pension scheme affected outcomes. When the 
recipient was female, the anthropometric measurements of grand-daughters of the 
recipients improved. Duflo warns that care must be taken when generalizing the results; 
difference in social and cultural norms could influence outcomes.  
 If the gender of the recipient does matter, then it does not necessarily mean that 
cash transfers to females produce more desirable results. There have been many papers 
showing that giving cash transfers to women has positive impacts on the well-being of 
household members
1
, but many of these studies lack a proper male counterfactual 
(Gutierrez et al., 2011). Gutierrez et al. examine an unconditional cash transfer to older 
adults in Mexico City and find that the gender of the recipient created different effects. 
Transfers to females resulted in higher household expenditures on children while giving 
the transfer to males increased school enrollment rates.  
The hypothesis that females have systematically different preferences is tested in 
this paper by examining if the impact of the cash transfers on child health is 
systematically different for similar male and female headed households. If the impact is 
significantly different, then it provides evidence that the hypothesis is correct. The fact 
that ultra-poor female headed households might be systematically different than ultra-
poor male headed households for unobservable reasons does complicate the answer. 
However, even if they are the results could still provide evidence that it is more effective 
for the cash transfers to be targeted at female-headed households. It is important to note 
                                                          
1
 See for example Thomas (1990), Rubalcava and Contreras (2000), Glewwe and Olinto (2004), Maluccio 
and Flores (2005), and Attanasio et al. (2009). 
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that this paper is not testing whether the cash transfer affects intra-household bargaining; 
rather it is testing the underlying assumption that females have systematically different 
preferences than men. 
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3. Data  
 
3.1 Program Description 
 
 The Malawi SCT program began in 2006 in the Mchinji district of Malawi. The 
goal of the program was to eventually expand to the national level. The Mchinji district 
pilot program allowed the government to assess the design of the program as well as to 
conduct an impact evaluation. The impact evaluation relies on the randomized phase-in 
of the program. In order to qualify for the program households had to be labor 
constrained, which was defined as the household lacking able-bodied adults between the 
ages of 19 and 64 or having a dependency ratio
2
 worse than three. It was also necessary 
for the households to be ultra poor, which was defined as consuming one meal or fewer 
per day and lacking valuable or productive assets. Several factors influenced the size of 
the cash transfer received. Households received a base transfer of $4.30 per month and an 
additional $2.85 per household member up to four total members. An additional $1.42 for 
every primary school aged youth and $2.85 for every secondary school aged youth was 
provided to recipient households. These cash transfers lacked explicit conditions; that is, 
there were no monitoring requirements like those found in many South American cash 
transfer programs. Recipients of the cash transfers did receive some social marketing 
promoting the use of the cash transfers for health and education. The average recipient 
household received approximately $14 a month. In the Mchinji district, this transfer was 
large enough to raise the income of recipients from the lowest decile to above average 
                                                          
2
 For the purposes of the SCT the dependency ratio was defined as the sum of children younger than 19, the 
elderly older than 64, and the number of chronically ill or disabled adults aged between 19-64, all divided 
by the number of able-bodied adults aged 18-64 (Miller et al., 2011) 
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(Miller et al., 2008). Therefore this transfer represents a very significant infusion of cash 
into recipient households. While many cash transfer programs have larger absolute 
transfers, this program has a much larger transfer relative to typical earnings in the 
community compared to other programs in Africa (Ghana, Mozambique, Kenya, and 
Zambia) and cash transfer programs in other parts of the world (Jamaica, Mexico, and 
Columbia) (Osei et al., 2012). 
 This paper analyzes household, adult, and child level data from an impact 
evaluation survey administered in 2007-2008. The survey assessed the effect of the pilot 
SCT program in the Mchinji district of Malawi. Eight Village Development Groups 
(VDGs) were chosen to participate in the survey. The eight VDGs are comprised of a 
total of 23 villages and each VDG has roughly 1,000 member households. Four of the 
VDGs were randomly chosen to be part of the treatment group and began receiving the 
transfer in 2007 immediately after being administered the baseline survey. The other four 
VDGs were assigned to the control group with eligible households receiving transfers in 
2008 after the final survey was administered. 
 In each of these VDGs, Community Social Protection Committees (CSPCs) 
ranked households to determine their eligibility status. The goal of the program was to 
provide cash transfers to the neediest 10% of Malawian households. Over 10% of the 
population in these groups met the uniform national eligibility criteria to be included in 
the program. The ranking process at the local level conducted by the CSPCS played a 
critical role because only 10% of households in the VDGs could receive the transfer. The 
total number of households deemed to be eligible ended up being 802 because each VDG 
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group contains roughly 1000 households and there were eight groups. Only eligible 
households, in both the treatment and control groups, were surveyed and they were 
visited up to three times to ensure the completion of questionnaires (Miller et al., 2011). 
Take-up rates were near universal because the SCT was unconditional. 
 There were three rounds of surveys. The baseline questionnaire was administered
3
 
in March 2007 which was just prior to commencement of treatment, the midline 
questionnaire was administered in September 2007, and the endline questionnaire was 
administered in April 2008 just before the control group received their first cash transfer. 
The baseline and endline surveys were both administered after the December-March 
rainy season when food stores have been exhausted in the ‘hunger season’. The midline 
survey was administered during the harvest season when households have a relative 
abundance of food from the recent harvests. A total of 751 households completed all 
three rounds of questionnaires. Fifty-one eligible households, 6% of the original sample, 
were excluded from analysis because they did not complete all three rounds of the 
survey.
4
 
 
3.2 Differences Between Control and Treatment Groups for Independent Variables 
 
The surveys contain a variety of detailed information on demographics, health, 
education, income, and expenditures. There are a considerable number of questions 
                                                          
3
 The Boston University Center for International Health and Development in conjunction with the Center 
for Social Research of the University of Malawi administered the survey and was responsible for the survey 
design and data entry. 
4
 Twenty-three of the households were lost due to death. Therefore only twenty-eight households failed to 
complete the survey for other reasons, which is only 3.5% of the original sample. 
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specifically relating to health and nutrition, including data on the types of food 
consumed, anthropometric measures (e.g., height and weight), expenditures related to 
health, sickness, disabilities, and general physical well-being. The questions varied 
slightly across the rounds of the survey with a general trend of adding more detailed 
questions in later rounds.  
 There were only eight VDGs that were randomized, which provides only 800 
households. The national eligibility criteria were rather strict and straightforward. 
Unfortunately, due to more than 10% of households meeting the eligibility criteria in the 
Mchinji district, the final selection took place at the community level. Different 
communities placed emphasis on slightly different household characteristics when 
ranking the households. These differences create some baseline differences between the 
treatment and control households (Miller et al., 2008). If there were a larger sample of 
VDGs the selection criteria should be on average relatively similar because there is no 
reason to believe that the randomized treatment and control VDGs employ systematically 
different selection criteria. The small number of communities means that care needs to be 
taken to examine the variation in baseline characteristics. Statistical methods are required 
to control for any significant variations in characteristics between treatment and control 
households. These statistical methods are discussed in detail in Section 4.   
 First, this paper establishes the validity of the counterfactual and examines any 
relevant differences between the control and treatment groups. There are two main types 
of relevant variables for this analysis, (i) the program eligibility criteria, and (ii) general 
variables on basic characteristics of the household and the household members. These 
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baseline summary statistics are shown in Table 1. T-tests are used to see if there are 
statistically significant differences in the baseline characteristics of the control and 
treatment groups.  
 Table 1 reveals there are significant differences in baseline characteristics across 
the treatment and control groups. These differences are especially pronounced for 
household demographic structures. For the variables related to eligibility criteria, 
treatment households are significantly more likely to have relied upon begging at some 
point. They are also much more likely to have a dependency ratio above three. The 
treatment households are also more likely to have experienced natural shocks in the form 
of droughts or floods between 2005 and 2007. This susceptibility to natural disaster might 
explain why treatment households are more likely to have resorted to begging. Control 
households, on the other hand, tend to be older and less educated. 
 These differences show that concerns related to the small number of Village 
Development Groups are valid. The CSPCs in the treatment group seemed to prioritize 
households with orphans and higher dependency ratios, while those in the counterfactual 
seemed to prioritize the elderly. Because younger Malawians are more likely to have had 
access to education, these differences in prioritizations also explain the gap in education 
levels of the household heads. These differences persist in the adult level data with adults 
in the treatment group being younger and better educated on average. These differences 
demonstrate the need to use statistical tools to account for these differences in order to 
ensure unbiased results. These adjustments are discussed in detail in the methodology 
section.  
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 Control households anticipating their future receipt of the cash transfer might 
systematically alter behavior in the control group. These households knew that they were 
eligible to receive the transfer at a later date. Due to the program being new and not 
widely known, the exact details of the program are unlikely to be well known. There is 
also some uncertainty in the households as to whether they would actually receive the 
cash transfer in the future. Therefore the anticipation effects do not seem likely. 
Additionally, the main effect of anticipating the cash transfer would be to increase 
expenditure in these households as a form of consumption smoothing. This increased 
expenditure would actually decrease observed effects and if positive health benefits are 
discovered, then the possible existence anticipation effects should increase the robustness 
of the results. 
 
3.3 Dependent Variables 
 
 Table 2 presents the summary statistics for the child level variables being 
analyzed. A variety of variables related to health and nutrition are used to examine the 
impacts of the treatment. The first group of variables consists of respondent reported 
measures of health. An adult respondent would answer the questions for the children in 
the household. The first question analyzed is whether the child has been sick in the past 
month. If the child had been sick, the respondent was asked what the child had been sick 
with. The most common illness was malaria so a variable was included measuring its 
prevalence. Malaria is also a useful indicator. Because simple measures, such as buying 
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mosquito nets, can be used to reduce its risk, it can serve as an indicator if households are 
using the cash transfer to invest in precautionary measures. 
 The next question captures whether the child has been sick over a month. The 
purpose of this variable is to see if the household tries to get treatment for recurrent 
illnesses after receiving the cash transfer when they previously have not. A relevant 
follow-up is if the household failed to seek any form of treatment for their previous 
illness (any type of medicine or help whether ‘Western’ or traditional) and another 
variable indicating if the household failed to get treatment because of a lack of money. 
 The next several variables try to assess the impact of illness by asking if the child 
had to stop normal activities because of illness or if others had to stop activities to care 
for the sick child. Both of these questions are followed up by questions asking the 
number of days that activity was stopped. Ideally, the cash transfer should reduce the 
necessity of stopping activities by preventing disease or increasing resilience, but there 
might be other effects as well. The cash transfer might reduce the opportunity cost of 
stopping regular activities, which could result in longer periods of inactivity due to 
illness. The results will tell whether either of these effects dominates the other.  
 The next set of variables consists of anthropometric variables. The survey team 
conducted several types of measurements for the members of the household. First, they 
weighed every child in kilograms. Next for children under the age of two, the survey 
team measured the length of the child laying down in centimeters. Finally, for children 
over the age of two, the survey team measured the child’s standing height. There are 
slight differences between measuring the length of a child and measuring the height of a 
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child (on average around .7 cm according to the WHO reference population), but this 
discontinuity is easily corrected. Henceforth, height is used to refer to both height and 
length measurements. 
 The height of a child represents the long run health and nutrition of a child. 
Height at any given age for a child represents years of accumulated investments that the 
household has made in nutrition and health (Martorell and Habicht 1986). Therefore, 
stunting and other height related problems represent years of undernourishment. Weight 
is much more variable in the short run and is most likely to provide evidence of 
improvement with the intervention. There are several issues with simply using weight to 
analyze the impact of the program. Weight is heavily dependent on height and age as well 
as nutrition. Therefore, this paper primarily uses a constructed Body Mass Index (BMI) 
calculated by weight in kilograms divided by height in meters squared.  
 The analysis utilizes a reference population developed by the WHO. This 
reference population represents what child growth should be under ideal circumstances, 
i.e., those with minimal constraints to growth. The WHO recently undertook a major 
project in order to create a set of growth standards for children under the age of five. This 
was because of criticism that the old NCHS study from 1977 represented children of only 
one country with a limited ethnic background. Therefore, the WHO set out to answer 
these criticisms. They studied numerous children raised in six different countries under 
optimal conditions.
5
 After they determined that the ethnicity was not a crucial factor for 
                                                          
5
 They studied 8,440 children under the age of five in Ghana, the United States, Brazil, India, Norway and 
Oman to check if results were consistent across ethnicities using advanced statistical techniques, such as. 
All of the children came from optimal conditions; breastfeeding, good diets, prevention and control of 
infections, the mother did not smoke, and healthcare was provided (WHO Child Growth Standards 2006). 
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the countries chosen, they merged the data set with the 1977 NCHS study to create 
consistent standards from birth to age nineteen. To ensure the validity and continuity of 
the combined sample, the Box-Cox Power Exponential method is applied along with 
appropriate diagnostic tools.
6
 
 The reference population is used to estimate how far these children are from ideal 
growth in height, weight, and BMI. Following the lead of other researchers, such as 
Duflo (2000), height for age, weight for age, and BMI for age z-scores are constructed. 
These scores are constructed by subtracting the median of the reference population for 
the relevant age and gender and then dividing the result by the standard error of the 
relevant reference population.
7
 Unfortunately, weight for age z-scores could only be 
constructed for children younger than ten years old. The age groups used are by age in 
months and gender which allows relatively granular and specific assessment. The primary 
issue with this approach is that the results are based on changes in z-scores, which makes 
interpreting the exact level of impact difficult. But, the main concern is whether there is 
an effect since the beneficial effects of nutrition and health on weight and height are 
cumulative and therefore increase over time. 
 
 
 
                                                          
6
 For more details please see pages and articles at 
http://www.who.int/growthref/growthref_who_bull/en/index.html. 
7
 For data and a detailed guide of how to replicate this process along with useful STATA tools please use 
http://www.who.int/growthref/tools/en/ for children aged 5-19 and 
http://www.who.int/childgrowth/software/en/ for children from birth until five years of age. 
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4. Empirical Approach and Results for Child Health Outcomes  
 
 While there are, on average, some differences in targeting methods between the 
treatment and control groups, the random assignment of communities along with the 
application of national eligibility criteria suggests that the groups do not radically differ 
from each other. They do not have productive or valuable assets, they lack food security, 
and they live in ultra-poverty. Despite these strong similarities, econometric techniques 
are used in order to create a more valid counterfactual. This paper utilizes two 
approaches; a difference-in-difference estimator and matching approaches. Because the 
variation between the counterfactual and treatment groups are due to variations in 
targeting criteria, rather than due to self-selection or other primarily unobservable 
characteristics, the variation should be linked to observable demographic characteristics. 
This paper uses data on these observable characteristics in order to create a valid 
counterfactual. I also use a Lee Bounds test in order to ensure the robustness of the 
results.  
 This section is structured as follows; first I outline theoretical basis of the 
difference-in-difference and propensity score matching methodology. I then apply these 
techniques to the general child health results. Next, I outline the difference-in-difference 
and linear combination framework used for determining if results differ by household 
gender; followed by the results. Finally, I discuss Lee Bounds tests and present the results 
from these tests. 
 
 
21 
 
 
4.1 Difference-in-difference 
 
First, a difference-in-difference, or double difference (DD), method is used. The 
purpose of the DD method is to control for time-invariant unobservable differences at the 
baseline in case there are problems with the experiment’s random design (Ravallion, 
2005; Gertler et al., 2011). The DD estimator regression framework is as follows: 
itit2i1it1i2t10it ZXtreatment*posttreatmentpostch  
  
where chi  is the child health indicator variable of interest for child i in time t, postt refers 
to whether the data is from pre (t=0) or post (t=1) treatment (post treatment is used 
exclusively to signify data from round three
8
), treatmenti indicates that the child i  
belongs to a household in the treatment group, X is a vector of baseline observable 
characteristics of the household that the child i belongs to, as well as time invariant 
demographic characteristics of the child. I control with baseline characteristics because 
the communal selection process was conditioned on these baseline characteristics. Z is a 
vector of time variant demographic characteristics of the child, such as age. εit is the error 
term.  
 The community selection processes resulted in a counterfactual that differed in 
statistically significant manner from the treatment group. For instance, the treatment 
                                                          
8
 Round one and round three are one year apart and are therefore more directly comparable than round two 
which occurred six months after the treatment began. Seasonality plays an important role in the results 
because round one and round three are during the ‘hunger’ season directly before the harvest while round 
two is after the harvest and occurs when food is relatively plentiful. Additionally, Bertrand et al. (2004) 
note issues with standard error consistency for DD estimations using many time periods of data so this 
problem is circumvented by relying solely on a pre and post treatment measurement. 
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communities prioritized households with orphans and higher dependency ratios while the 
counterfactual prioritized the elderly. These differences should be controlled by Xi which 
captures baseline observable characteristics of the household. The regression also 
includes the conditioning variables in Xi (such as meals per day and the lack of valuable 
or productive assets), which should improve both the accuracy and the precision of the 
results (Stock and Watson, 2003).  
 A variety of household level controls are used, including: eligibility criteria, 
household head years of schooling, age of household head, whether the household head is 
elderly, an interaction between a household head’s educational attainment and the elderly 
household head dummy, and an interaction term for additional elderly household 
members when the household head is elderly. I also use some basic demographic 
characteristics, such as age in months and gender, though there is a lack of child level 
specific conditioning variables. A probit regression model is used on all dummy 
variables.
9
 For all count variables I use a linear regression model. Lastly, all standard 
errors are adjusted for heteroskedasticity.
10
 
The coefficient δ1 controls for aggregate factors that would cause a change in itch  
even in the absence of treatment. δ2 captures possible differences between the treatment 
                                                          
9
 Ai and Norton (2003) raised concerns over the inclusion of interaction terms in nonlinear regression 
models. A recent paper by Puhani (2012) addressed these concerns by noting that it is appropriate to focus 
on the sign of interaction terms for nonlinear difference-in-difference models and he notes that the 
coefficient provides an estimate of treatment effects with the nonlinear transformation rule. I checked 
whether using an OLS regression provides similar results in order to ensure the robustness of our results 
and they are similar both qualitatively and quantitatively. 
10
 Because there are eight VDGs, estimating cluster-robust standard errors at the VDG level may seem to be 
appropriate. However, Cameron et al. (2008) find that for small numbers of clusters (between five and 
thirty) clustered standard errors are too large. This leads to a greater likelihood of rejecting the hypotheses. 
Further, it is not possible to use cluster robust standard errors with the matching procedures. In order to be 
consistent across models, and because the possible overestimation issues with cluster-robust standard 
errors, I use robust standard errors.  
23 
 
group and the counterfactual pre-treatment. Finally, β1 is our DD estimate of the impact 
and should capture the effect of the cash transfer upon treatment households. 
 
4.2 Propensity Score Matching 
 
DD estimates should be able to create statistically reliable results because the 
regressions have adequate controls and the difference between treatment and control 
groups are based on observable characteristics. However, in order to ensure the 
robustness of the results this paper also relies on matching techniques. Propensity score 
matching (PSM) with kernel weighting is used to test the robustness of the overall results. 
Kernel weighting means that closer neighbors are weighted more than those neighbors 
with more distant PSM Values.
11
  
PSM uses probit or logit models in order to calculate the predicted probability of a 
household receiving treatment based on observable characteristics; 
                        
As explained by Rosenbaum and Rubin (1983), the function e(x) is the propensity 
score and it gives the propensity towards exposure to treatment given the baseline 
observed covariates x. These probabilities are used to match households with similar 
propensities (e(x)) in order to create a valid counterfactual. This technique is most 
effective when groups differ solely based on observable characteristics (x) that can be 
used to match them. For testing overall results, the matched households have their results 
                                                          
11
 A variety of matching specifications were performed in order to check the accuracy and robustness of the 
results, including using five nearest neighbor matching. These results were broadly consistent with those 
from kernel weighting. 
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compared (for gender-related results households without adequate matches are simply 
excluded rather than matching households and examining the differences in results). PSM 
has been shown to provide experimental conditions by Heckman et al. (1997, 1998), as 
well as Dehejia and Wahba (1999, 2002), as long as the matching is accurate (no 
unobservable differences). Because the Malawi data has a variety of covariates on 
observable differences and differences are based on observable characteristics, the 
matching should effectively create close to experimental conditions and therefore an 
accurate indicator of the effects of treatment. Since village development groups are 
randomly assigned to control and treatment groups, PSM should be especially effective at 
creating experimental. The results of the probit regression that was used to calculate 
propensity scores are presented in Annex 1. All of the estimates use bootstrapped 
standard errors with fifty repetitions in order to ensure the reliability of the standard 
errors. This approach should also account for the fact that the propensity score is 
estimated (Diaz and Handa 2006). 
The procedures developed by Abedie and Imbens (2011) are used in the PSM 
process that allow for biased-corrected estimates of average treatment effects. The 
matching procedure and the PSM procedure use the same set of confounders and the 
standard errors are adjusted for heteroskedasticity.
12
 
 For general results of impact, matching is used in combination with DD meaning 
that the matching is capturing differential trends over time rather than final differences in 
levels. This approach should control for any time-invariant characteristics at baseline that 
                                                          
12
 The PSM procedure using the Stata command psmatch2 with standard errors calculated using 
bootstrapping . The five nearest neighbor matching used the nnmatch command developed by Abedie et al 
(2004) and includes the bias adjustment and calculation of robust standard errors. 
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are not adequately controlled for. These results are generally consistent with the standard 
DD results with only slight changes in magnitude.  
 Table 1 shows that the baseline characteristics of the treatment and control groups 
after adjustment using kernel weighted propensity score matching. No statistically 
significant differences remain for baseline characteristics after PSM. The scores are also 
divided into five blocks so that balancing tests could be performed in order to check for 
consistency across covariates in each block. This additional step checks to make sure that 
households with similar characteristics are matched together. Otherwise it might be 
argued that households with similar propensity scores might have the same score (since 
all of the controls are distilled into one number) for systematically different reasons and 
therefore present an invalid counterfactual. Without significant balancing issues, it seems 
as though the matching creates a valid counterfactual.  
 
4.3 General impact of treatment on child health outcomes 
 
 Table 4 contains the results of the DD and Kernel PSM regressions. The results 
are generally consistent across both approaches. The results for other PSM specifications 
are consistent as well and are available upon request. There seems to be somewhere 
between a nine percentage point and thirteen percentage point decrease in the number of 
respondents reporting that their child has been ill in the last month. Unfortunately, there 
is no corresponding decrease in malarial rates. Malaria can be recurrent so there might be 
residual effects of previous illnesses before the cash transfer even if the household has 
taken precautionary measures. There is a slight decrease in the number of children ill for 
26 
 
longer than a month, but it is only statistically significant at the 10% level and only for 
the DD specification. If a child is sick for over a month, that might indicate more severe 
health problems that could require better supply side institutions to fix. 
 Treatment households are more likely to access medical care of any form. The 
results are significant at the 1% level across specifications. The DD method calculated a 
6.4 percentage point decrease in respondents not seeking care for a child when sick and 
the Kernel PSM approach calculated a 9.2 percentage point decrease in the same variable. 
According to the Kernel PSM approach this decrease might be due to better being able to 
afford preventative care, but the DD results are inconclusive. 
 There is also a statistically significant decrease in children reporting that they 
have to stop regular activities because of illness, as well as a decrease in the number of 
days they stopped regular activities for when sick. Missing fewer days to sickness also 
decreases the number of days missed of school. There is also a highly statistically 
significant decrease in the likelihood that other members of the household have to stop 
their regular activities to care for a sick family member. Both regression specifications 
calculated effects of similar magnitude with roughly 22 percentage point decreases.  
 The next section is the anthropometric results. These measures would provide the 
strongest indicator of improvements in health and nutrition because they are definitively 
measured and therefore not susceptible to respondent error. All of these variables are 
measured by z-scores created using a WHO ideal growth reference population (see data 
section for details). Unfortunately, it seems as though none of these variables have any 
statistically significant changes. This is perhaps not unexpected given the sample under 
consideration. In particular, height represents accumulated investment in nutrition and 
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health. Skeletal growth is most variable for those under five years old. Therefore, a 
sample containing older children is unlikely to manifest any change. Ideally, there would 
be a large sample of very young children. Unfortunately, this paper has to rely on a larger 
sample that includes older children.
13
  
 There might be several reasons for these results. First of all, it might be that the 
time period of one year is too short. This might be especially true because other papers 
(Covarrubias et al. 2012) have shown that these households invested heavily in their 
productive output. The final round of surveying was before the year’s harvest and 
therefore the households have not reaped the returns of their productive investments yet. 
The new crops harvested might improve their dietary diversity and caloric intake 
significantly. The additional investment in their land plots might also have required extra 
household work because of barriers to outside hiring. This extra work might have drained 
extra calories from the household. Secondly, the household might simply not have 
invested heavily enough in the health and nutrition of the children to produce statistically 
significant results. Without conditions and monitoring, the adults who received the 
transfer might have elected to spend more of it on their own well-being. Finally, there 
might be supply side constraints on the quality of food and nutrition. While the household 
might be able to purchase larger quantities of food, they might not have access to food 
with higher nutritional quality. Maize is overwhelmingly the crop and food of choice in 
Malawi. Therefore it might be harder to improve the nutrition and health of children.  
                                                          
13
 The height and weight variables were not only tested by using constructed z-scores in order to ensure that 
the lack of results was not due to a specific methodology. I also ran DD regressions on weight, height, and 
BMI without relying on z-scores, as well as creating measurements of thinness and severe thinness based 
on WHO standards and running the regressions on these variables. The results were similarly not 
statistically significant. 
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Overall it seems as though there are some positive results of the cash transfer. 
There is a sharp reduction in the number of children sick in the past month, a large 
reduction in the number of children who do not receive care, a reduction in the number of 
children forced to stop regular activities, and a major drop in the number of respondents 
reporting that others had to stop regular activities to care for children. 
 
4.4 Linear combination and DD framework for gender specific results 
 
This section seeks to answer whether different genders have systematically 
different preferences for expenditure on children. Unlike many other cash transfers, the 
Malawi SCTS was not targeted at a specific gender. Around 65% of the households 
containing children are female headed. It is possible to see if female-headed households 
have systematically different preferences by using linear combination tests on the impact 
of the cash transfer. The exact DD specification I use is as follows: 
itit2i1iit4it3
it2t1ii2i2i10it
ZXtreatment*femhhh*postfemhhh*post
treatment*postposttreatment*femhhhfemhhhtreatmentch




 
 where femhhh is a dummy variable with one indicating that the household head is female 
and 0 indicating the household head is male. The linear combination used was ( 4 - 3 )-(
2 - 1 ).  ( 4 - 3 ) captures the difference between treated ( 4 ) and untreated ( 3 ) 
female headed households post treatment. ( 2 - 1 ) captures the difference between 
treated ( 2 ) and untreated ( 1 ) male headed households post treatment. The impact for 
male-headed households ( 2 - 1 ) is then subtracted from the impact for female-headed 
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households ( 4 - 3 ) in order to determine which gender of household heads had the 
largest impact on the health of children in the household. Finally, tests are run to 
determine if the difference in impacts is statistically significant. 
 
4.5 Results for impact differences between male and female headed households 
 
The results of these linear combination tests are presented in Table 5. The only 
statistically significant result was the fact that male headed households had a larger 
reduction in malarial rates than female-headed households. The lack of clear results is an 
interesting finding. Most cash transfers in South America are targeted towards females 
because they are assumed to have systematically different preferences and they are 
assumed to prefer investing in their children. In this case, it seems as though female-
headed households are not specifically investing more in their children. 
 There might be several reasons for this lack of a difference. First of all, the 
transfers are being given to female headed households rather than females within a 
household. Females as part of a larger household might be seen as primarily responsible 
for domestic tasks in more traditional societies. Therefore, the role that they have might 
shape their expenditure preferences. If they are seen to be primarily responsible for 
domestic tasks then this perceived societal responsibility might shape their expenditure 
preferences. These female headed households have to handle the full range of household 
responsibilities, including production, and therefore might have preferences shaped by 
these more general responsibilities. 
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 This result highlights the cautious approach that Duflo (2000) encourages in 
regards to making assumptions about an individual’s preferences solely based on gender. 
She highlights the fact that care must be taken when generalizing her results that cash 
transfers to grandmothers improved the anthropometric measures of their grand-
daughters. The cultural context plays a large role in shaping these preferences. 
 
4.6 Lee Bounds 
 
 This paper also uses Lee Bounds tests in order to further ensure the robustness of 
the results. It is used for treatment evaluation problems where problems such as non-
response, sample attrition, or other structural problems might skew the results. It helps 
the researcher make sure his or her results are valid by creating upper and lower bounds 
on the possible treatment effect. As long as the treatment effect is still statistically 
significant for the lower bound then the results remain valid even in the worst case 
scenario.  
 This technique was developed by Lee (2009) for analyzing the impact of the Job 
Corps program. He wanted to assess whether the program improved the wage rate of 
participants. Unfortunately, the issue of sample selection arises. The same issue can arise 
with the cash transfer. The health benefits are only observed for children who remain in 
the household and the cash transfer incentivizes households to keep children by 
increasing benefits for each child. The transfer might also decrease the risk of attrition 
through child death or household dissolution from the household head dying. Those who 
are induced to stay are the ‘marginal’ group while those children who would have been in 
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the household anyways are the ‘infra-marginal’ group. By examining the selection 
probabilities of the control and treatment groups one can determine the possible size of 
the marginal group (n). Assuming a worst case scenario that all members with the highest 
health benefits are members of the marginal group (n) an upper bound on the child health 
effect is created. By assuming that all members with the smallest health benefits are 
members of n, a lower bound on the child health effect is created.
14
 As long as the upper 
bound on the effects of the intervention in the Malawi SCTS is still statistically 
significant then the results should be accurate regardless of any attrition or non-response 
effects. It must be remembered though that this bound represents a ‘worst case’ scenario. 
Additionally, there are inferential reasons to believe that the attrition might actually cause 
the sample to understate the impact of the cash transfer. The households most likely to 
dissolve, the children most likely to die, and the households least likely to retain children 
are all likely to be associated with poor health.  
 
4.7 Results of Lee Bounds Testing 
 
 Two different specifications for the Lee Bounds test were used. First, the tests 
were done with weights generated from propensity scores. Secondly, the Lee Bounds 
tests were performed without any weights. The results are broadly similar across both 
specifications and are found in Table 6 and Table 7. 
                                                          
14
 The Lee Bounds test relies on only two assumptions. The first assumption is independence or random 
assignment. This assumption is fulfilled by the Malawi SCTS. The second assumption is monotonicity 
which means that the treatment should only affect sample selection in one direction.  
32 
 
 The only variable that retains its significance even under the ‘worst case’ scenario 
is the reduction in children who did not seek treatment because they lacked money. The 
Lee Bounds test does undermine the robustness of the results presented earlier, but there 
are several important factors to keep in mind. First of all, there is supposed to be random 
assignment for Lee Bounds tests. The Malawi Social Cash Transfer was imperfectly 
randomized and therefore this will introduce additional ‘noise’ to the Lee Bounds results. 
For Lee Bounds testing, it is not possible to use controls. These controls might eliminate 
some of the noise, especially since multiple econometric techniques and specifications 
were used. Secondly, it must be remembered that the bounds generated represent best and 
worst case scenarios and even under the worst case scenario several other of the results 
were close to achieving statistical significance. 
 Finally, there are inferential reasons to believe that the worst case scenario is 
unlikely. As previously noted, the cash transfer incentivizes households to keep children 
and improvements to health might make other forms of attrition more likely. On the other 
hand, children in the counterfactual who are lost due to attrition might be more likely to 
have poor health. Poor health increases the likelihood of attrition due to death. 
Constraints on the resources of a household increase the likelihood of children leaving 
due to lack of resources (for example possibly moving into a relative’s household). These 
hypotheses need to be empirically examined, but they do provide prima facie evidence 
that the worst case scenario is unlikely. 
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5. Conclusion 
 
 As cash transfers become more and more prevalent, it is increasingly important to 
understand exactly how they work. This paper tries to answer two main questions. First 
of all, I examine whether the increased purchasing power of the cash transfer can 
improve the health outcomes for children even when there are weak supply side 
institutions. Secondly, I check the hypothesis that women have systematically different 
preferences than men for investment in the human capital of their children. I use several 
different econometric techniques (Difference-in-difference, propensity score matching, 
and Lee Bounds) in order to ensure the robustness of my results. By answering these two 
questions, I am trying to help provide additional evidence about how to best design cash 
transfer programs and the conditions under which they are most effective. 
 It is important for policy makers to know if cash transfers can be effective even in 
the absence of supply side institutions as cash transfer become increasingly prevalent. 
This paper shows that cash transfers can be effective even in the absence of adequate 
supply side institutions. The cash transfer reduced the frequency of illnesses significantly 
and reduced the impact of sicknesses on the households. Additionally, it removed barriers 
to accessing care. On the other hand, the lack of anthropometric results hints that other 
approaches should be taken in combination with cash transfers. Luckily, many programs 
already do this by distributing fortified products along with the cash transfer. 
Oportunidades is one prime example. The program provides nutritional supplements to 
infants between six and twenty three months of age as well as to undernourished children 
between twenty-four and fifty-nine months old. Van de Gaer et al. (2012) and Gertler 
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(2004) both found significant positive impacts of the Oportunidades program on 
anthropometric measurements. 
 Additionally, this paper shows that care must be taken when deciding who 
receives the transfer. In Latin America, most of the programs are targeted towards 
females. However, in the Malawi SCTS, female-headed households produced similar 
results to male-headed households. There are costs associated with targeting the transfers 
exclusively towards females; it means some male families are excluded and it might 
reinforce traditional gender standards that view the female as being in charge of the 
domestic sphere. The female-headed households in Malawi have to manage more general 
household responsibilities including production and do not seem to have systematically 
different preferences than the male headed households. This result provides evidence that 
the culture and societal conditions must be taken into consideration rather than assuming 
that females automatically have different expenditure preferences centered on traditional 
domestic roles.  
 Even though these results hold for multiple specifications that these issues are far 
from resolved. The results pertain to certain cultural (gender norms) and societal 
conditions (supply side institutions and governance). A fruitful area for future research 
would be to examine how strong of a role culture plays in determining gender 
preferences. The Lee Bounds results also show that the effect of cash transfers on 
household stability should be examined. With so many people living in poverty 
worldwide, it is critical to continue to rigorously assess poverty alleviation programs in 
order to determine the most effective approaches. 
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Tables 
 
TABLE 1: Baseline Characteristics 
  Overall sample Propensity score adjusted sample 
  Overall 
Contro
l Treat 
Test 
(p-
val) Control Treat 
Test 
(p-val) 
Eligibility Criteria        
0-1 Meals per Day (0/1) 0.527 0.508 0.548 0.271 .0.568 0.546 0.645 
HH Member Begs (0/1) 0.382 0.329 0.438 0.002 0.453 0.435 0.704 
Monthly Exp. (Kw/capita) 192.434 193.304 191.513 0.938 155.412 191.913 0.135 
0-1 Assets (0/1) 0.503 0.523 0.482 0.261 0.510 0.485 0.572 
Dep. Ratio Over 3 (0/1) 0.393 0.326 0.463 0.000 0.470 0.462 0.850 
Orphans (number) 0.551 0.383 0.729 0.000 0.605 0.702 0.409 
Household characteristics        
Head education (years) 1.587 1.205 1.992 0.000 2.032 1.953 0.740 
Over 60 (0/1) 0.597 0.650 0.540 0.002 0.537 0.538 0.984 
Household size (number) 4.091 3.541 4.671 0.000 4.643 4.593 0.742 
Children (number) 2.463 1.979 2.975 0.000 2.941 2.928 0.933 
Members aged 0-5 (number) 0.425 0.376 0.477 0.062 0.461 0.476 0.808 
Members aged 5-10 (number) 0.800 0.630 0.981 0.000 0.928 0.964 0.637 
Members aged 11-15 (number) 0.951 0.759 1.153 0.000 1.160 1.133 0.794 
Members aged 15-59 (number) 1.136 0.933 1.351 0.000 1.340 1.320 0.855 
Members aged 60+ (number) 0.779 0.845 0.710 0.005 0.691 0.699 0.890 
Natural Shock (0/1) 0.609 0.573 0.647 0.038 0.602 0.649 0.680 
N 751 386 365      
Child Characteristics        
Age (months) 114.342 113.105 115.286 0.398 115.45 115.64 0.939 
Male (0/1) 0.506 0.530 0.489 0.093 .49285 .52941 0.119 
Orphan (0/1) 0.219 0.185 0.245 0.005 .22635 .22911 0.893 
N 1732 750 982      
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TABLE 2-Pre-Treatment Dependent Variables 
 
 
 
TABLE 3-Pre-Treatment Child Variables by HH Head Gender 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Control Intervention Ttest (p-value) Control Intervention Ttest (p-value)
Child Health
Sick in the Past Month (0/1) 0.669 0.650 (0.420) 0.541 0.422 (0.000)
Malaria in Last Month (0/1) 0.095 0.094 (0.945) 0.069 0.061 (0.490)
Ill over a Month (0/1) 0.082 0.075 (0.637) 0.039 0.021 (0.022)
Sought Treatment (0/1) 0.051 0.101 (0.000) 0.105 0.042 (0.000)
No Treatment b/c Money (0/1) 0.010 0.039 (0.000) 0.044 0.000 (0.000)
Stopped Reg. Activ. b/c Illness (0/1) 0.498 0.457 (0.106) 0.386 0.281 (0.000)
# of Days Stopped (Days) 5.012 5.204 (0.583) 5.292 4.681 (0.133)
Others Stopped Reg. Activ. To Provide Care (0/1) 0.430 0.462 (0.310) 0.628 0.523 (0.011)
# of Days Stopped (Days) 5.346 5.638 (0.561) 5.265 4.946 (0.578)
Weight in Kg 25.653 25.670 (0.977) 28.268 28.687 (0.503)
Height in Cm 122.720 122.252 (0.713) 126.588 128.104 (0.194)
N 750 982 750 982
Before Treatment After Treatment
Male HH Head Female HH Head Male HH Head Female HH Head
Sick in the Past Month (0/1) 0.589 0.704 0.626 0.668
Malaria in Last Month (0/1) 0.113 0.087 0.102 0.09
Ill over a Month (0/1) 0.053 0.094 0.058 0.086
Didn’t Seek Treatment (0/1) 0.043 0.055 0.1 0.102
No Treatment b/c Money (0/1) 0.005 0.013 0.021 0.049
Stopped Reg. Activ. b/c Illness (0/1) 0.44 0.523 0.457 0.459
# of Days Stopped (Days) 4.133 5.328 5.231 5.202
Others Stopped Reg. Activ. To Provide Care (0/1) 0.478 0.412 0.511 0.436
# of Days Stopped (Days) 3.897 5.992 5.435 5.784
Weight in Kg 25.685 25.639 25.95 25.518
Height in Cm 121.861 123.084 122.375 122.159
N 230 520 363 613
Control Intervention
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TABLE 4- General Results for Impact on Child Health 
      DD 
Kernel 
PSM 
Sick in the Past Month (0/1) -0.092** -0.134*** 
 
(0.043) (0.034) 
Malaria in Last Month (0/1) -0.018 -0.030 
 
(0.020) (0.023) 
Ill over a Month (0/1) -0.027* -0.028 
 
(0.014) (0.019) 
Did not Seek Treatment (0/1) -0.064*** -0.092*** 
 
(0.015) (0.027) 
No Treatment b/c Money (0/1) 0.028 -0.081*** 
 
(0.020) (0.016) 
Stopped Reg. Activ. b/c Illness (0/1) -0.064 -0.131*** 
 
(0.041) (0.037) 
# of Days Stopped (Days) -0.710** -1.025*** 
 
(0.291) (0.313) 
Others Stopped Reg. Activ. To Provide Care 
(0/1) -0.131*** -0.152*** 
 
(0.03) (0.032) 
# of Days Stopped (Days) -0.716*** -0.988*** 
 
(0.254) (0.306) 
Weight for age (z-score) -0.065 -0.038 
 
(0.052) (0.044) 
Height for age (z-score) 0.002 -0.001 
 
(0.028) (0.027) 
BMI for age (z-score) -0.014 0.001 
  (0.027) (0.021) 
N= 1732     
 * =p<0.1    ** =p<0.05   ***= p<0.01 
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TABLE 5- Differences in Impacts between Female and Male Headed Households 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
    DD   
Sick in the Past Month (0/1) 0.070 
   
(0.055) 
Malaria in Last Month (0/1) 0.071** 
   
(0.029) 
Ill over a Month (0/1) 0.006 
   
(0.023) 
Did not Seek Treatment (0/1) -0.023 
   
(0.029) 
No Treatment b/c Money (0/1) 0.009 
   
(0.032) 
Stopped Reg. Activ. b/c Illness (0/1) -0.001 
   
(0.053) 
# of Days Stopped (Days) -0.174 
   
(0.426) 
Others Stopped Reg. Activ. To Provide Care 
(0/1) .014 
   
(0.046) 
# of Days Stopped (Days) -0.088 
   
(0.367) 
Weight for age (z-score) -0.022 
   
(0.213) 
 Height for age (z-score) -0.265 
 
   
(0.169) 
 BMI for age (z-score) 0.046 
       (0.118) 
 N=    1732 
  
  
* =p<0.1    ** =p<0.05   ***= p<0.01     
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TABLE 6- Lee Bounds Results with Weighting 
  
 Lower 
Bound 
 Upper 
Bound 
Sick in the Past Month (0/1) -0.184*** -0.049 
Malaria in the Last Month (0/1) -0.082** 0.035 
Ill over a Month -0.071*** 0.015 
Did not Seek Treatment -0.170*** -0.019 
No Treatment b/c Money (0/1) -0.098*** -0.037*** 
Stopped Reg. Activ. b/c Illness (0/1) -0.176*** -0.019 
# of Days Stopped (Days) -1.616*** 0.134 
Others Stopped Reg. Activ. To Provide Care (0/1) -0.200*** -0.043 
# of Days Stopped (Days) -1.616*** -0.028 
Weight for Age (Z-Score) -0.017 0.000 
Height for Age (Z-Score) -0.002 0.032 
BMI for Age (Z-Score) -0.041 0.023 
N= 1747 
* =p<0.1    ** =p<0.05   ***= p<0.01 
 
TABLE 7- Lee Bounds Results without Weighting 
  
 Lower 
Bound 
 Upper 
Bound 
Sick in the Past Month (0/1) -0.174*** -0.046 
Malaria in the Last Month (0/1) -0.064*** 0.044** 
Ill over a Month -0.068*** 0.020 
Did not Seek Treatment -0.168*** -0.039 
No Treatment b/c Money (0/1) -0.089*** -0.031*** 
Stopped Reg. Activ. b/c Illness (0/1) -0.143*** 0.006 
# of Days Stopped (Days) -1.553*** 0.203 
Others Stopped Reg. Activ. To Provide Care (0/1) -0.171*** -0.022 
# of Days Stopped (Days) -1.467*** 0.104 
Weight for Age (Z-Score) -0.105 -0.029 
Height for Age (Z-Score) -0.048 0.041 
BMI for Age (Z-Score)\ -0.052* 0.028 
N= 1747 
 * =p<0.1    ** =p<0.05   ***= p<0.01 
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Annex 1: Probit Results for Propensity Score Estimation 
  Child 
0-1 Meals per Day (0/1) 0.128 
 (1.87) 
HH Member Begs (0/1) 0.0825 
 (0.61) 
Monthly Exp. (Kw/capita) 0.000285 
 (1.53) 
0-1 Assets (0/1) -0.198** 
 (-2.74) 
Dep. Ratio Over 3 (0/1) -0.340** 
 (-2.61) 
Orphans (number) 0.210*** 
 (4.53) 
Head education (years) 0.0442** 
 (2.75) 
Head over 60 (0/1) 0.476* 
 (2.55) 
Household Size (number) 0.239 
 (1.57) 
Children (number) -0.0567 
 (-0.64) 
Members aged 0-5 (number) -0.142 
 (-0.95) 
Members aged 5-10 
(number) 
0.175 
 (1.14) 
Members aged 11-15 
(number) 
0.00325 
 (0.02) 
Members aged 15-59 
(number) 
0.0893 
 (0.64) 
Natural Shock (0/1) 0.254** 
 (2.97) 
Head over 60*Members 
aged 60+ 
-0.402* 
 (-2.14) 
Log household size 
(number) 
-0.568 
 (-1.16) 
Log dependency ratio 0.508*** 
 (3.44) 
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Log of age (months) -0.00113 
 (-0.01) 
Over 65 yrs. Old*Education 0.0139 
 (0.38) 
HH begs*Natural Shock 0.132 
 (0.83) 
Age (months) 0.000128 
 (0.07) 
Male (0/1) -0.0865 
 (-1.29) 
Orphan (0/1) -0.414* 
 (-2.54) 
Constant -1.079 
 (-1.87) 
N 1573 
t statistics in parentheses 
* =p<0.05    ** =p<0.01   
***= p<0.001  
 
 
 
